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Technological Fix: Altering the
Consciousness of the Social Work Profession
DENNIS SALEEBEY
University of Kansas School of Social Welfare

Social work, like otherprofessions, seeks a jolt of technology and technical
sophistication into its theoretical and practical repertories. Such efforts
have, thus far, ignored the considerable ethical and axiological freight
that "Techne" brings with it. Ironically, many of the implicit values of
techniques subvert the unique and defining values of the social work
profession. This paper offers a cautionary note and a prescription for
avoiding the "technological fix."
Social work, like most professions, seeks a rush of science
and technology into its bloodstream. Since the late sixties there
have been persistent, increasingly strident, and thoroughly argued pleas for the fashioning of an empirical (read: wrought of
scientific methodology) basis to both understanding and helping (Briar, 1980; Fischer, 1981; Hudson, 1982). Such plaints are
not unusual in a society that, though it may misunderstand it,
fawns over "Science"-with a big S. Some years ago, C.P. Snow
(1964) wrote of the two cultures of the Western world, Art and
Science, and the paradigmatic clash between them. More recently, Jacques Barzun (1964) has suggested that our cultural
world has but a single guiding paradigm-Science. As a culture, and within most of our social institutions, we have become slavishly devoted to the ideologies and myths, the boons
and bounties of Science and offspring, technology. We worship
abjectly and daily at the altar of Science. Whether designing a
nuclear holocaust or unraveling the psychic skeins of love, we
turn to Science as the way to know and to technology as the
way to do. The professions most visibly bound to Science are
the most revered. Professions that in the public mind are not
covered under the canopy of Science scurry to seek its shade.
What does an allegiance of this sort to what we understand
as science mean? There is a single science, and it is both method
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and methodology (that is, it is both a way to understand and
discover, and a philosophy of discovery). In the social sciences,
and in the social work profession in particular, the advocates of
a more empirically funded body of knowledge and technique,
the version of science that is usually proposed is positivist.
The positivist position has two apparently implacable dicta: all
propositions regarding the nature of the universe must be reducible to statements describing hard data (data that are observable, first, and second, capable of being reduced to numbers);
and general propositions about the nature of the universe must
be developed through the process of inductive inference and
that means, in essence, inference from observable data (Overton, 1984). While many apparently are shying away from this
hard position, in one form or another it still separates the advocates of empirically-derived, technologically sound practice,
from those who are more circumspect about that possibility.
Walter Hudson (1982) puts it bluntly: "Constructs that cannot
be defined, operationalized, and then measured are mentalisms
that are useless to an understanding of the world in which we
live" (p. 256).
Technique, it is assumed, rather than ideology, philosophy,
intuition, artistry, empathic grasp, dialectical exposition, or dialogical exploration will become the hallmark of practice. While
widely considered to be a creation ultimately traceable back
to theory, techniques have many parents and, in the end, are
merely means to be judged by their effectiveness. The scientific
approach to practice is nearly willing to abandon theory in the
service of developing these means of intervention:
Thus, practitioners can have available to them a body of specific
techniques to apply with their clients, based on a careful assessment of the client, situation, and problem. That the techniques of
intervention will have been selected, if possible, because of their
demonstrated effectiveness also suggests that their use will lead
to the increased probability of successful outcome. (Fischer, 1981,
p. 203)
Conceivably, a practitioner might author an eclectic hodgepodge of techniques that bore little ethical, theoretical, or conceptual relationship to one another or to any coherent body
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of knowledge solely because they were "validated" empirically
and known to "work."
This view of science presumes that the world operates lawfully, and that, though elegant, the world is essentially simple
and straightforward in its operation. The firmest barrier to a
more complete understanding of the world, human and nonhuman, is the failure of craft: that is, the correctable lack of better
instruments and methods of discovery. Beneath these assumptions lies a more durable one-Science will save us. However,
there are developments in the "harder" sciences that suggest
these assumptions are embarrassed by a number of factors, from
the inevitable influence of the observer to puzzling gaps and
changes in the appearances of the material world. Even for a
human brain to know, say the structuralists of neuroscience,
there must be the systematic destruction of a certain amount
of data and input in order for the brain to categorize and to
hierarchically arrange information so that it can be at all useful. The fact that the brain is able to do this is nothing short
of a miracle, but it speaks to the fact that even at the level
of the sense organs, "interpretation" is going on (Stent, 1976;
Gazzaniga, 1988).
The methods of science, it is thought, and the techniques derived from them carry no implicit or important meaning, have
no substantial or measurable ethical freight (Hudson, 1978).
Whether one proceeds through a controlled experiment or an indepth interview to discover some aspect of the world, the only
question is how powerful is the method in eliciting answers,
solving problems, and accumulating data?
Some argue that the distinction between knowing and doing, between assessment and intervention, will disappear as
our science becomes more effective and our practice becomes
more empirically accountable. In a sense, every encounter with
a client, every planned change in agency will be an experimental space in which the demeanor and method of scientist resemble, if not being epistemologically the same as that of the
practitioner (Seigel, 1984).
These, then, are some elements of our current faith in science and technique. To put the central issue-should technique
(or technology) be the centerpiece of social work practice?-in
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larger compass, Jeffrey Record (1980), a senior fellow at the Institute for Policy Analysis in Washington, DC, despairs of the
trend he sees in the service academies. The current focus of
the academies, he observes, is on the strategies and logistics
of developing and deploying various destructive and defensive
technologies. Thus, warfare is an endeavor solely informed by
science and is regarded as only technically (not morally, philosophically, or geopolitically) problematic. Our ability to conduct
war and to defend ourselves improves, it is believed, only as
our technology improves.
This rationalization or 'scientification' of warfare breeds a disconcerting hubris in its practitioners because it de-emphasizes,
if it does not altogether deny what is called 'His sacred majesty,
Chance'-whimsy, the irrational or unpredictable event or circumstances, Fortuna-in shaping victory or defeat on the battlefield.
It is an hubris that disregards the elder Moltke's (A Prussian field
marshal and brilliant tactician in the 19th century - D.S.) wise caution that 'no plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond
the first meeting with the.., enemy because it cannot govern the
independent will of the opposing commander.' The study of history, by contrast, is a humbling experience; the historical record
bulges with one aborted attempt after another by the best and the
brightest to identify, assemble, and manipulate the ingredients of
military triumph. (Record, 1980, p. 19)
The current situation in the Persian Gulf certainly exemplifies the clash of technical hubris and persistent contingency. I do
not mean to draw too strained an analogy between the fortunes
of war and the vagaries of social work practice. The point is
merely this: fascination with technique frequently has the effect
of driving out other facets of an activity or endeavor whether
they are the considerations of history, the complexities of human nature, the ebb and surge of passion; the chastening and
executive powers of intuition and philosophy, or the energies
of the sensual.
The Risks of the Technological Fix
The social work profession wants a fix: a sanctifying jolt of
technology into the marrow of the profession; a fix that, like
all fixes, can enhance the sense of power and control, inflate
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the self-image, and obliterate the nagging confusions and tensions of reality. As with every fix, the threat of addiction always looms, inviting both the subversion of judgment and the
corrosion of values. What, specifically, are the risks of the technological fix?
Jacques Ellul (1965) argues that "... a principal characteristic of technique is its refusal to tolerate moral judgments"
(p. 97). Ellul here is exposing the implication that technique
is value-free. Enthusiasts of technique claim that other than
the pursuit of effectiveness and efficiency of application, technique is an ethical neuter. Likewise, questions of good and evil,
right and wrong, truth and falsity-any moral desiderata-lie
well beyond the interest of technique. Thus, given the validation of a technique, that is to say, insurance that the technique
works, its application then becomes a foregone conclusion. But
techniques do have considerable ethical and political heft, and
each technique insinuates something about human nature and
the human condition. The leucotomy works, electro-convulsive
therapy works, the phenothiazines work, but each demands a
particular posture and attitude in the minister, supposes something about the state and worth of the recipient, and its effects
can never be fully accounted for (Cohen, 1988). The fact that a
technique works seems to absolve the user of moral choice and
suggests that, after a time, the technique takes on its own life,
invoking what Ellul (1965) has called the "automatism of technical choice" (p. 79). Because it exists, because it works, it must
and will be used, value questions and dilemmas preempted.
The pursuit of technique also obscures the importance of
practice. Christopher Lasch (1984), in discussing what he believes is our cultural confusion between practice (in the Aristotelian sense of the development of character, the quest for a
higher moral standard of action, and the elaboration and teaching of the virtues specific to various forms of practical activity)
and technique (which concerns itself exclusively with the means
to given ends), puts it this way:
As work and politics lose their educative content and degenerate
into pure technique, the very distinction between technique and
practice becomes incomprehensible. Industrial societies have almost completely lost sight of the possibility that work and politics
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can serve as character-forming disciplines. These activities are now
understood as means of satisfying material needs. Moral ideas,
meanwhile, lose their connection with practical life and with the
virtues specific to particular practices and become confused instead with the exercise of personal prejudices and tastes, which
can neither be justified nor explained and which should therefore
not be regarded as binding on anyone else. (p. 255)
How does this apply to social work practice? The problems
that people bring to social workers are often problems of belief,
conscience, will, and knowledge and they occur in a particular, though often unclear or confusing, sociopolitical context. To
make people "feel" better, or more assertive, or less tense, or
more happy, and to have the techniques for doing that, without addressing the demands of "praxis" (What knowledge is
critical to my understanding, the articulation of my beliefs and
intentions? What do I need to do in order to further my involvement in resolving the moral, political, and personal issues and
questions of my life?) is to merely dabble in the possibilities of
character and action. It may even encourage mindless adjustment to a larger, more profound context for being. To teach,
say, social service workers techniques of stress management is
not an immoral thing to do. But to do it without addressing
the ethical, political, and social issues which in a public bureaucracy breed "burn-out," turnover, and discouragement is
to thwart the possibility of collective action, and the development of the virtues needed to confront the burdensome realities
of bureaucratic employment (Galper, 1980).
The employment of technology and technique in human affairs also may be based upon a distortion of the nature of human
experience in the world. They assume degrees of standardization and predictability that may apply only to the most surface
conditions of human behavior. The practitioner, too, may have
to assume simplicity and ignore the more subtle and contentious
elements of human activity. Our hunger for new techniques
may, in part, be based on the very fact that they can be counted
on to "banalize" human life. Problems of sexuality, child discipline, eating, working, maintaining a family, for example, become merely mechanical difficulties to be tuned up through
some esoteric fiddling. Purely technical intervention literalizes
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the metaphor of the machine just as the narrow and "enclosing
framework" of technical application preempts the consummate
human attributes-consciousness, conscience, desire, and intention. Reducing the marital relationship-its snags, tangles, and
ineffabilities, its moments of divinity and despair-to a contract
in which each partner plies the other with contingent positive
reinforcement seems to assume that marriage, when it falters,
suffers from a thoroughly correctable technical defect and that
one marriage is pretty much like another. Marriage then is not
a problem of being, of inadequate poetry (enhancing visions,
symbols, and words), of failed virtue (not to know what to believe or do) but rather a mechanical one: somehow the engine
of the marriage has developed a disconcerting ping. Perhaps it
requires a clinical "Mr. Goodwrench."
Ivan Illich (1977) in his bitter critique of the professions
and the medical establishment in particular, describes the ultimate effects of professional "intervention" or technique as "disabling," leaving us unprepared to understand and cope with the
pains and tribulations that life brings; even unable to recognize
or express organismic Joy. Through appropriation by the professions expectable human experiences of challenge, passage, and
transformation have been removed from our aegis and can no
longer inform, heal, or strengthen us. They have been converted
to problems to be solved by an expert.
As the professions have burrowed their way into our economy, philosophy, and our psyches, we have, as a society, become devoted to what Illich (1977) labels staple-values as
opposed to use-values. Staple-values circumscribe the consumer
role and encourage us to suspend our own knowledge, interest, and motivation so that we may purchase what we need,
for example, to chase the blues away, bring the centrifugal family back together, mourn and grieve for a deceased loved one.
To a significant degree, such purchases are intended to rid us
of the pain and confusion, the anguish and ambiguity of such
mundane crises. Use-values, on the other hand, flow from active doing and seeking. They yield a system of meaning and
technique that grows out of individual and collective intention,
resolve, and action in meeting and solving problems. For usevalues to flourish there has to be teaching, an intergenerational
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context in which to learn about the tools of life and the lessons
and virtues extracted from those tools. A couple's desire for a
natural childbirth experience may not just be a reaction against
the risks of a hospitalized, benumbed, less involved birth, but
also an implicitly correct sense that to involve oneself in this
most common and remarkable human event, to return some
degree of control and responsibility to the self, bodes well for
the development of this child and the evolution of this family
(Illich, 1976).
The seepage of technology and technique into the wellspring
of our culture also contaminates the poetic appreciation of life.
As Barrett (1979) has suggested, in a society dominated by technicians and obsessed with technique, the technician runs the
poet out of town on a rail:
If the poetry does not touch the daily round of existence somewhere or other, then we ourselves have become homeless on this
earth. The figure of the poet thus represents a dimension of our
human being, the loss of which would leave civilized man a cripple. What is the difference between a poet and a technician? The
poet walking in the woods loses himself in the rapture of its presence; the technician calculates the bulldozers that will be needed
to level it.
Barrett does not, nor do I, advocate somehow ridding ourselves of the technician so that we can unembarrassedly enjoy
the fruits of Erato. But there is a sense in which the idea of
technology and the reality of technique crowd out other experiences of the situation, other possible meaning to be found in
or placed upon it.
In the field of practice, what technology stanches is artistry,
that kind of knowing and doing based upon sensual involvement, tacit appreciations, spontaneous re-visions and
"presence." As Donald Schon (1987) puts it:
In the terrain of professional practice, applied science and research-based technique occupy a critically important though limited territory, bounded on several sides by artistry. There are an
art of problem framing, an art of implementation, and an art of
improvisation-all necessary to mediate the use in practice of applied science and technique. (p. 13)
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Finally, technology and technique are inherently conservative. Almost always controlled, shaped, and implemented by
those with superior economic, social, and political power, technology is also conservative in that it can subvert human
freedom-the exercise of choice, moral intention, the urge to
autonomous action. It does this in two ways. First, the guiding
assumption of much technological development is that the exigencies of life eventually can and should be tamed by technique.
We shall overcome psychic malaise, not through personal or collective craft or action, but through the passive reception of regimen, tool, or intervention. This orientation undermines the basis for social and political change: individual and group awareness of the context from which problems arise; understanding or
seeking out the precise relationship of private troubles to public
issues; and translating this critical consciousness into some sort
of personal or collective project. As Guba and Lincoln (1989) say
of positivist science ". . .facts are heavy-laden, . .. exist within
some value system and ... are embodiments of a value system"
(p. 123). The values embodied by empirically-based technical artifacts are inherently institution preserving and non-subversive
(Jacoby, 1987).
Secondly, technological development and the reliance on
technique erode the possibility of commitment and choice by
touting bogus individualism above all over values-an individualism of desperation, detachment, and illusion beset by a
siege mentality.
Confronted with an apparently implacable and unmanageable environment, people have turned to self-management. With the help
of an elaborate network of therapeutic professions, which themselves have largely abandoned approaches stressing introspective
insight in favor of 'coping' and behavior modification, men and
women today are trying to piece together a technology of the self,
the only apparent alternative to personal collapse. (Lasch, 1984,
p. 58)
Technology preserves the status quo by playing to and boosting this ersatz individualism at the expense of community, interdependence, cooperation, collective will, political knowledge
and action, not to mention self awareness (as opposed to selfmanipulation), all of which are necessary conditions of change.
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After all, if the common conditions of one's life are such to
have elevated the blood pressure menacingly, why bother to
ask questions or to engage others in the possibility of reform
or action? A pill, a run at the biofeedback machine, building
a stress management regime are easier, not to mention more
immediately gratifying. The pernicious or malignant social conditions will remain to nettle us, others, and succeeding generations, but our pressure is down to a swell 120/70. We won't,
I think, ask the questions we should about an environment or
lifestyle that can kill.
Altering the Social Work Profession's Consciousness
The desire of the profession of social work for the fix, and
the jolts it has already received, have moved it some distance
away from its central missions and beliefs. Veins throbbing with
the need for a hit, the intensifying of the craving for scientific
respectability and technological facility, will send social work
careening away from the core of its concerns so that fifteen
years hence we may not even recognize it, transformed so radically by clinical-technical debauchery (Lloyd, 1984). The profession may become partners to what Hampden-Turner (1970)
calls the "cryptoconservatism" of technology (pp. 303-347). The
symptoms of our addiction are prodromal, perhaps, but highly
visible:
e The waning of concern for the poor, the disreputable, the
oppressed, the disenfranchised.
* A continuing thirst, hard to slake, for professional respectability, that is to say, more Ph.D.s, more "science," more technique, more clamoring for "accountability," more alliances with
the established professions, and a continuing dalliance with the
medical-technical model of practice.
- Amnesia for the progressive roots of the profession and
the implicit radical agenda suggested by social work values
(e.g., social justice).
* A knowledge base, that by implication or actual statement,
encourages the antic "psychologizing" of human problems and
predicaments.
* The expansion of private sector practice.
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* The rapid growth of industrial (read: corporate) social
work practice and the increasing growth of medical social work
practice.
0 The spread of credentializing movements and legislation
as the primary political interest of the profession.
* The enthusiastic brandishing of "symbolic science" (e.g.,
single subject design) as a mode of practice or the possibility of
the wedding of researcher/practitioner roles.
The symptoms are becoming more pronounced, the addiction nearly established.
The Fusion of Eros and Techne
One should not stand, curmudgeon-like as a cantankerous
foe of technology, deluded by a romantic memory of a past
that never was, afraid of a future that is unformed. Technology
and technique have always been a part of humanity's creations,
stemming from curiosity or challenge, empowered by vision,
and articulated by toil and test. But they also have been more
or less under the control of their creators, intended to serve
the cultural and human values of the moment. In our time,
technology has outstripped our efforts to make it serve us, its
own prepossessing sway replacing more humane philosophies
and practices.
It is within the power of technology and technique to suppress the sensual. Norman 0. Brown (1959) argues that technology originates from only a part of the human experience-the
anal. The oddity of the psychoanalytic lexicon aside, Brown's
thesis is important. The anal character (formed during unceasing struggles for control during early childhood-often over
control of one's very body) is fascinated with control, possession, power, the machine and the lifeless. Anality opposes eros,
the urge to life, the energy of the sensual and organismic. Like
all instinctual strivings, anality has become institutionalized,
suffused into the infrastructure of social institution and ideology. It is technology, more than anything else, that breathes
life into the anal possibility because it provides tools for ignoring the "mess" of life, for channeling and restraining unpredictable surges of human passion, for detaching ourselves from
the frivolous play of chance as well as the idiosyncrasies of our
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neighbors, and for accumulating goods and power in the interest of maintaining control. The tools may be inanimate but they
are powerful enough to deliver eros to the subterranean realm
of fantasies, wishes, and dreams, and eventually, to distort its
very nature (Berman, 1989).
As Morris Berman (1989) suggests, unless technology is under the control of, or fused with, the sensual and resonant, its
contribution to humanity will, at best, be merely accidental and,
at worst, out of our hand and destructive. In the end, our individual and political wills begin to sag under the weight of
technique and technological growth.
For social workers, the fusion of Techne and Eros means that
we should not be beguiled by technique. Because it "works" is
always a feeble reason for employment. Social workers must begin with the human condition, as it is and as it might be, and
identify with the insistent and the inchoate urges and passions
of those they serve. To invigorate the experience of life, to enhance intention and will, to assist in the politics of struggle, to
align with the power of eros is social work's mission. If technique and technology further that agenda, so be it. But if any
given technique rationalizes and extends oppression, denies the
reality of individual or collective meaning, obscures reality, suppresses tacit knowledge and artistry, then the fact that it works
is bane not boon.
The visible source of eros is care. "Care," says Rollo May
(1969), "is a state in which something does matter; care is the
opposite of apathy. Care is the necessary source of eros, the
source of human tenderness" (p. 286). Further, "It is a feeling
denoting a relationship of concern, when the other's existence
matters to you; a relationship of dedication, taking the ultimate
form of being willing to get delight in or, in ultimate terms,
to suffer for, the other" (May, 1969, p. 300). without care, its
giving and receipt, we wither and die, physically, maybe; ontologically, certainly. Without care, passionate energy cannot be
harnessed in the service of will-of doing, effecting, creating
with purpose and sensation. Technique is merely tool, a device
of our caring. As social work moves to emulate other professions, it is in danger of spitting out its own sweet moral core
for the bitter rind of technical facility and social approbation.
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The desire for the technological fix comes primarily from
the academy, not the agency. But rest assured that the urge
will gradually spread to the profession as a whole. Whether
practitioner or academe there are some guidelines for the fusion
of Eros and Techne.
The social work profession should consider abandoning the
Positivist paradigm of knowledge development and employment (Pieper, 1985; Haworth, 1984; Saleebey, 1979; Goldstein,
1987; Weick, 1987). The history of this world view is the history
of attempts to control and alter nature, both conceptually (objectivity, operationalism) and actually (technological mastery,
technique). Since Thomas Kuhn (1970) wrote The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, there has been a gradual widening of the
way in which we regard scientific knowing and doing (Capra,
1982; Guba, 1990; Rosaldo, 1989). The activity of science is the
conscious creation of visions and images of the forms of nature
so that the world will have meaning for us. We debate over particular constructions, but the core issue is how much experience
and energy any given image inspires in us (Barrett, 1979). Let
us give vent to the proposition that the core human activity is
to give meaning to the inner and outer world (Bruner, 1990).
To do so in a way that invigorates, appreciates, and enhances,
and does not oppress the object of our interest, is a signal mark
of caring, of empathy (Rifkin, 1985). Since the methodological
axis around which social work turns, is caring (Perlman, 1989)
our singular methodological charge is to understand and be astute about what caring is or might be, how it may appear, what
forms it takes, what to care about, and how care, in any individual case (of policy or practice), can be transformed into action
(Morris, 1978).
Technology and technique must always be subordinated to
caring, the moral and ethical energies of the profession, and
to fuller sensual involvement in the helping. Any technological scheme that expels caring must be immediately reevaluated
and, perhaps, surrendered. Certain versions of behavior modification make some social workers edgy. Why? It may be that
these techniques appear to crowd out caring. Thompson (1978)
says it incisively (though he is speaking of the quality of Skinnerian science and not derived practices): ".. . the science of
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Skinner bears the same relation to the scientific tradition as the
Inquisition does to morality" (p. 91). Thompson means to counterpose the antic power of technique and the requirements of
moral caring. In characterizing the "true" nature of professional
practice, Donald Schon (1983) observes:
In the varied topography of professional practice, there is the
high, hard ground where practitioners can make effective use of
research-based theory and technique, and there is the swampy
lowland where situations are confusing 'messes' incapable of technical solution. The difficulty is that the problems of the high
ground, however great their technical interest, are often relatively
unimportant to clients or the larger society, while in the swamp
are problems of greatest human concern. (p. 42)
Technique thrives, in part, on the power inequality between
the user and the recipient. Caring, on the other hand, assumes
equality and a degree of psychosocial intimacy. Caring is, thus,
profoundly democratic, an act of faith in the face of ambiguity, bureaucratic iniquity, and human frailty. Here one trembles
with the meek rather than consorting with the powerful.
It is also time to amend the metaphorical language of technology rampant in the social work profession. Propelled by aspirations to professionalism, the search for scientific authority,
and the mushrooming therapeutic enterprise, these metaphors,
upon examination, reveal an attitude that runs directly counter
to caring. 'Client system,' 'target populations,' 'intervention
strategies,' and the like are characterizations of aspects of assessment and helping that are neither particularly accurate nor
especially humane in their implication. Of the same ilk as bureaucratese, they are laughable because of their semantic arrogance but dangerous because they tend to disguise pain and
suffering, stifle sensuality, and thwart intellectual grasp. They
move us a step away from the humanizing of our concern and
effort. Szasz (1978) refers to a similar "debauchment of the language of healing in the service dehumanizing and controlling
persons by technicizing and therapeutizing personal relations"
(p. 208).
The fusion of Eros and Techne turns out to be, in the individual case or the collective consequence, the unleashing of
"desire" (passion, sensuality, organismic energy) in the service
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of project (doing toward imagined or unimagined ends; the
transformation of the self in action or interaction). "Care," argues Joel Kovel (1981), "becomes transcendent because, by
affirming the indestructible value of the individual, it also criticizes the world according to whose standards she/he is wanting
and so points the way toward its transformation" (p. 249). But
"... care is noninstrumental: it is posited as an end in itself, not
as the adjunct to some organizational purpose. The harsh reality is contained in the paradox that care must remain humble
and. . . shortsighted if it is to be authentic" (p. 250).
To put it in the strongest possible way, the utter reliance
on technique and method can only mute Eros, not unleash it
toward intention, commitment, and transformation. Rollo May
(1969) makes the point:
... there comes a point... when the cult of technique destroys
feeling, undermines passion, and blots out individual identity.
The technologically efficient lover, defeated in the contradiction
which is copulation without eros, is ultimately the impotent one.
He has lost the power to be carried away; he knows only too well
what he is doing. At this point, technology diminishes consciousness and demolishes eros. Tools are no longer an enlargement of
consciousness but a substitute for it and, indeed tend to repress
and truncate it. (p. 96)
Techne must help clarify our experience, focus our passion,
and assist in the provision of meaning to our efforts in the real
world. If it cannot, then it may be time to redefine what it means
to be a "professional" social worker.
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